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ABSTRACT: Economic reforms face a collective action problem: they trigger the reaction 
of groups that expect significant losses, while the anticipated gains are often dispersed 
across the population and too uncertain to animate strong popular support. This pattern 
may exhibit different characteristics in a clientelist economy where the affected groups 
are client groups under the protection of political parties. The reform agenda of the 
Mitsotakis government in Greece (1990-1993) illustrates that the collective action 
problem affects primarily the internal structure of the clientelist parties and thereby their 
capacity for political mobilisation. Reforms that depart from the established political 
equilibrium on economic policy will undermine the internal cohesion of the government 
party and will offer the opposition party the opportunity to strengthen its own unity and 
political mobilisation capacity.  
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Interest groups compete and lobby around the allocation of the benefits and costs of 
reforms initiated by the government (Alesina and Drazen 1991; Geddes 1994; Heller, 
Keefer and McCubbins, 1998; Schamis 1999). These groups often act as veto players 
effectively delaying or blocking reform initiatives (Haggard 2000:28; Tsebelis 2002). 
Depending on the institutional setting, the government may enjoy a degree of autonomy 
from group pressures and some room for manoeuvre around the options of co-optation, 
re-alignment, compromise and compensation (C.f. Evans 1992; Waterbury 1992). The 
political and economic links that have developed between the government and social 
groups determine the degree of autonomy of each actor from one another as well as their 
bargaining power. In that perspective, preferences and, ultimately, choices over economic 
policy in a given economic structure can be better understood in light of the dominant 
pattern by which political power regulates economic activity and allocates economic 
resources. 
A clientelist economy is a distinct type of economic structure in which politicians and 
political parties reserve a great part of economic resources and opportunities for their 
supporters. The practice involves the regular exchange of benefits and develops into a 
strategic tool by which political parties organise their campaign infrastructure and 
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coordinate their activists (C.f. Zuckerman 1979; Chubb 1982; Ware 1992, 1996; Mayhew 
1986). Clientelist transfers serve as incentives for the recruitment of supporters to take an 
active part in the party’s campaign. In that way, clientelism serves as a solution to a 
collective action problem of the type described by Mancur Olson (1971) this time 
concerning the mobilisation capacity of political parties. The party becomes the host 
organisation for the client groups which, in their turn, contribute to the party’s capacity 
for political mobilisation. These groups develop permanent ties with their host party and 
gain stable access to selective benefits available within or around the public sector. 
Consequently, they act like any other rent-seeking group (Stigler 1971; Krueger 1974; 
Buchanan, Tollisson and Tullock 1980; Becker 1983 and 1985; Tullock, 1993 and 2005), 
and can become powerful and well-coordinated players that may considerably constrain 
government autonomy (C.f. Callaghy 1990; Evans, 1992; Waterbury 1992; Haggard, 
Cooper and Moon 1993). 
Compared to typical rent-seeking groups, however, client groups are integral or at 
least proximate to political parties. Rent-seeking in a clientelist party system is primarily 
embedded within party structures. The political party is not simply the recipient of the 
demands of interest groups but, more importantly, it becomes the accommodating arena 
for these rent-extracting actors. This reduces the cost of lobbying and strengthens the 
degree of party commitment to clientelist demands. As rent-seeking is integral to party 
structures it is shaped by the close interaction of client groups with party cadres and party 
hierarchy. For the political patrons, supply to client groups is vital for their capacity to 
mobilise active contributors in political campaigns. For client groups, the election of their 
patron party to power is a collective good which secures regular access to rents, and to 
which they are highly incentivised to contribute.  
These observations suggest that clientelism differs from the general image in the 
literature on interest group activity. It is thus reasonable to expect that due to its 
distinctive properties clientelism has different implications for the prospects of economic 
reform beyond what the general literature on rent-seeking has hitherto contended. Client 
groups, parties and the government cannot be portrayed as veto players autonomous from 
one another in terms of preferences and political behaviour. Instead, client groups and 
their patron parties are tied in relations of interdependency and have to act in 
coordination for mutual gain. Government autonomy to navigate itself across shifting 
alliances is expected to be considerably limited. Shifts in the allocation of rents must 
affect primarily relations inside the party and, ultimately, the cohesion and mobilisation 
capacity of each party. Hence, a systematic understanding of rent-seeking in a highly 
clientelist party system and of its impact on economic policy requires a focus on both 
intra-party and inter-party dynamics.  
 
Reform in a clientelist system: a party mobilization problem 
These distinct patterns of clientelist rent-seeking can be hypothesised from a rational 
choice perspective. Given that rent-seeking is integral to party organisations and both 
party leadership and cadres depend on their support in political campaigns, the capacity 
of client groups to influence policy may be substantially stronger. Within-party and 
between-party competition over clientelist demands will tend to create a strong incentive 
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for the intensification of clientelism. It can be argued that clientelism introduces a 
systematic bias in economic policy in favour of preserving and expanding clientelist 
supply. The allocation of clientelist benefits can be depicted as the political equilibrium 
in a party system in which no party has an incentive to unilaterally reduce its 
commitments to client groups for fear that it will alienate its clients and undermine its 
mobilisation capacity. Limiting patronage will essentially open up a space for its 
opponent to step in and recruit from the party’s clientele. Moreover, in the longer-run, as 
rent-seeking groups and political patrons exploit as much as possible the available rents, 
they ultimately deplete the country’s fiscal resources. A ‘tragedy-of-commons’ situation 
can emerge sooner or later (C.f. Valesco 1994, 1998; Tornell 1995). This ‘collectively 
irrational’ outcome (the term used by Rodrik 1996:10) may take the form of a debt crisis, 
a balance-of-payment crisis or both.  
By the same token, when pressing economic conditions bring forward the dilemma 
for the government party to choose between the launching of reforms and fiscal 
profligacy that caters for rent-seeking groups (Geddes 1994), the government in a 
clientelist party system may be less likely to push forward and act as a neutral arbiter 
among various distributive claims. Given its entrenched commitments to party clients, it 
will be difficult to reduce rent-seeking and abandon old allies or to build a new 
supporting coalition around a different constellation of interests as suggested by Geddes 
(1994), Heller, Keefer and McCubbins (1998) and Schamis (1999). The dominant 
strategy dictates that the party in government must avoid reforms that reduce the supply 
of clientelism unless this is urgent and inevitable. In that case, a reform package that 
significantly departs from the clientelist equilibrium is likely to undermine the cohesion 
of the party in government which relies on its ties with client groups. Such a move will 
also offer the opposition a powerful opportunity to orchestrate political action against the 
reform initiative. It is thus rational for the government to avoid or delay as much as 
possible any decision on reforms that will reduce the scope for political patronage such as 
privatisation and market liberalisation. When the government is under extreme pressure 
to implement a reform agenda, as long as the reforms mark a considerable shift away 
from the dominant strategy and reduce the scope for clientelism, the government will find 
itself in a politically suboptimal position.  
These rational-choice predictions are testable hypotheses that require empirical 
confirmation. At an initial and rather explorative stage they can be traced and refined in 
the study of a case-study that is paradigmatic for the general class of phenomena 
(Eckstein 1975:80; Kuhn 1987; Flyvbjerg 2006), in our case, a highly clientelist economy 
that has undergone periods of economic crisis and rounds of policy reforms. This article 
examines Greece’s first experience with far-reaching macroeconomic and structural 
reforms under the centre-right government of the New Democracy party led by 
Constantine Mitsotakis between 1990 and 1993. The scale and content of economic 
reforms implemented or under consideration by the Mitsotakis administration, as well as 
the timing of the reforms right after the spiralling of clientelist politics in Greece during 
the 1980s, make this period a suitable case-study for examining clientelism as a variable 
affecting the choice and fate of economic reforms in a highly clientelist economy. 
 By the mid-1980s, structural weaknesses and fiscal imbalances in Greece associated 
with extensive state ownership and continuous political interference in the economy had 
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generated severe macroeconomic imbalances, declining competitiveness and rising 
unemployment. Between 1985 and 2000 consecutive Greek governments implemented 
reform programmes under pressing economic conditions. Throughout that period, the 
dominant presence of clientelist politics was widely regarded as a hindrance to the 
effective design and implementation of the reform agendas (Pagoulatos 2003; Pelagidis 
and Mitsopoulos 2006; Featherstone and Papadimitriou, 2008). This is hardly surprising 
knowing that clientelism and rent-seeking have been persistent features of Greece’s 
political economy for decades.1 Greek governments acted systematically as ‘collective 
patrons’ (Sotiropoulos, 1994) to their active supporters most of which were appointed in 
the broader public sector and enjoyed a privileged status in terms of employment 
protection, wages, extra allowances and pension schemes. Promotions and access to 
crucial decision-making posts largely depended on associations with, and loyalty to the 
government party and its leading unionists and politicians.  
 It is, therefore, a key question to explore the degree to which these clientelist 
commitments shaped and obstructed reform agendas in Greece. To do so, it is essential to 
take into account the clientelist ties that connected decision-makers with the groups that 
resisted reforms, which part of the literature has regarded as ‘veto-players’ (Featherstone 
2005, Mitsopoulos and Pelagidis 2011). The content and pace of the reforms 
implemented prior to Greece’s entry to EMU varies by government and so do the 
linkages of each government with client groups in the broader public sector. PASOK had 
a dominant position among the employees of the broader public sector and their trade 
unions were controlled by leaders affiliated with the party. Some of the unionists later 
entered central politics as PASOL MPs and ministers. By contrast, New Democracy had 
a weaker political influence in the public sector but quite a few of its party cadres had 
close ties with the trade unions.  
 Moreover, the reforms implemented by Papandreou (1985-1989), Mitsotakis (1990-
1993), Papandreou (1993-1996) and Simitis (1996-2000) differ considerably in terms of 
the policy mix each of them followed and, more significantly, in terms of the impact each 
of these reform programmes had on the supply of clientelist politics. The austerity 
programme of PASOK, Greece’s socialist party, between 1985 and 1987 relied on 
taxation and incomes policy. Both measures diffused the cost of macroeconomic 
adjustment across the population leaving existing clientelist relations unscathed. 
Likewise, the last PASOK government under Andreas Papandreou (1993-1996) 
postponed privatisations to avoid the reaction of the party’s base and mostly relied on 
direct taxes to balance public finances. A mixture of partial structural reforms and 
relatively strict fiscal policy was implemented by the Simitis government (1996-2000) in 
the run-up to EMU. Each of these reform programmes faced a different pattern of 
collective mobilisation, which can be associated with the content of the reforms 
implemented and the degree to which they affected embedded clientelist relations in the 
broader public sector. 
 By comparison, the economic policy of the Mitsotakis government was Greece’s 
first encounter with a bold and extensive agenda designed to tackle the macroeconomic 
crisis that was simmering since the mid-1980s. The government openly advocated 
extensive privatisation and market liberalisation aiming at the reduction of the size and 
role of the state in the economy. This was a sharp departure from the political equilibrium 
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in which Greece’s two main political parties, New Democracy (ND) and PASOK, had 
been situated since 1975 during which they both followed policies of fiscal expansion 
and extensive state ownership that were largely catering for their political clienteles. The 
structural reforms announced by Mitsotakis were about to reduce the turf for clientelism 
for groups embedded in the broader public sector. Consequently, Mitsotakis’ policies 
were seen as a threat to the status of privileged groups in the broader public sector that 
were closely linked to political parties, especially PASOK, and soon came under fire 
from both the opposition en bloc and segments of the New Democracy party. Reaction to 
reforms offered PASOK’s ailing leader, Andreas Papandreou, the opportunity to restore 
the party’s mobilisation capacity and image that had been previously tarnished by a series 
of economic scandals. In New Democracy a within-party rebellion undermined the 
party’s cohesion and eventually brought down the government. The party suffered a 
landslide defeat in 1993, just three years after coming to power.  
 
Clientelism, crisis and Mitsotakis’ liberal agenda 
New Democracy won the April 1990 election with 46.8% of the popular vote and gained 
a narrow parliamentary majority of two MPs after two preceding elections held within a 
year in which it had failed to gain the absolute majority in the Parliament due to the 
highly proportional electoral law passed by the previous PASOK government. During the 
prolonged electoral period, PASOK had campaigned under the heavy shadow of several 
corruption cases. His leader, Andreas Papandreou was awaiting trial for his alleged 
involvement in a banking fraud scandal. Deserted by some of its former political allies 
and in poor health, Papandreou was facing increasing unrest among leading PASOK 
cadres over the prospects of the party under his leadership. Although he remained popular 
with the party base, Papandreou barely survived an informal vote of confidence when his 
favoured candidate for the post of party secretary was elected during a confrontational 
party meeting at the Pentelicon Hotel in November 1989. 
Faced with deteriorating public finances and a stagnant economy, the new 
government launched an ambitious economic programme aiming at fiscal consolidation 
and structural reform. The reform proposals included the reduction of the size of the state 
through extensive privatisations, a significant degree of market liberalisation and cuts in 
the subsidies to ailing companies, agricultural cooperatives and pension funds. They also 
included the shutting down of ailing companies owned by the state in the event that their 
sale to private investors was not feasible, the reform of the terms of lending by state-
owned banks in order to conform to private banking standards, the opening of areas of 
economic activity currently dominated by public utility companies to private 
entrepreneurship, managerial independence in the running of state enterprises, and greater 
efficiency in the central administration.2 The declared agenda pledged to shift the 
country’s economic paradigm away from the statist policies of the past fifteen years. 
Prime Minister Mitsotakis openly condemned ‘the inconsiderate and unproductive 
expansion of the public sector’ and explicitly expressed his liberal economic ideology: 
‘...There is proof around the world that the rules of the market guarantee better 
and cheaper products… Healthy competition is the best form of price control. I 
would say, the only form of control’ (Praktika Voulis, Δ Session) 
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Mitsotakis’ rhetoric and policy agenda contradicted the long tradition in Greek politics of 
state intervention in the economy in the service of clientelist commitments. Market 
liberalisation and privatisation appeared to deny the party’s own interest in securing and 
expanding its own clientelist base. This stance may be attributed to Mitsotakis’ liberal 
ideological beliefs and the pressing economic conditions of the 1980s. Following his 
confrontational election to the party leadership in 1984 Mitsotakis openly proclaimed a 
liberal economic ideology for New Democracy. He remained a divisive figure within 
New Democracy for several years (Katsoudas, 1987), supported by the liberal segments 
of the New Democracy party but mostly tolerated rather than embraced by New 
Democracy’s traditional voters and party cadres who regarded him, nonetheless, as the 
most suitable leader at the time to defeat Andreas Papandreou, the man who in 1981 had 
broken the right-wing monopoly of power in Greece since the 1960s. Mitsotakis’s 
pragmatic political language contrasted with Papandreou’s ‘populist’ style. The rhetoric 
in favour of market liberalisation and privatisation also resonated with the paradigmatic 
shift in Western Europe towards freer markets that was espoused by European institutions 
under the Single Market Programme. The political developments in Europe throughout 
the 80s were in sharp contrast to what was widely understood as failed economic policies 
in Greece (Verney 1993; Kazakos, 2001: Botsiou, 2002). Given New Democracy’s 
ideological proximity to the idea of a freer market and its pro-European stance, it was 
easier for the party to adopt a political discourse that was critical of fiscal overspending, 
excessive state ownership and over-regulation. The same rhetoric was also strengthening 
the pro-European credentials of his party.  
 Moreover, by the late 1980s it had become clear that any elected government would 
have to take drastic measures to tackle Greece’s soaring public debt, large budget 
deficits, high level of unemployment and declining competitiveness. As the clientelistic 
system was breaking down on its own weight, a call for a radical U-turn in economic 
policy was much more acceptable among voters and party members. There were, 
however, notable differences in the rhetoric and policy agenda between New Democracy 
and PASOK which can be associated with their different party bases. The discourse of 
market liberalisation fell on sympathetic ears among centre-right voters consisting of 
middle-class social strata, mostly small and medium-sized entrepreneurs, lawyers, 
doctors and other middle-class professional groups. The same agenda was threatening the 
privileged status of employees in the public sector where PASOK had a dominant 
political presence. In that respect, a liberal agenda by New Democracy appeared to be 
consistent with a rational party strategy to dismantle parts of the clientelist system 
dominated by PASOK. The reduction of the public sector through privatisation could in 
the long run reduce PASOK’s hegemonic presence, which the party had secured thanks to 
its strong clientelist organisations in the broader public sector (kladikes).  
 
Initial asynchrony between stabilisation and structural reforms 
Government policy in the first two years fell short of the liberal rhetoric articulated by 
Mitsotakis and his key allies. Fiscal consolidation relied mostly on horizontal measures 
such as increases in taxation and a strict incomes policy in the public sector, and less on 
spending cuts and structural reforms (Bank of Greece 1992). Some progress was 
achieved in reducing the trade deficit, inflation and interest rates.3 There were, however, 
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numerous policy inconsistencies. Increases in taxation to cover the government’s 
shortfall in tax revenues had the unintended result of fuelling inflation which rose by 
three percentage points at the end of October 1991 (Bank of Greece 1992). Furthermore, 
while some restrictions were imposed on public sector wages, pensions and the welfare 
state, all other sources of public spending increased beyond what was predicted in the 
budget. Between 1990 and 1991, there was a 40.8% increase in payments for public 
relations, a 34.0% increase in travel expenditures for members of the armed and security 
forces and a 21.1% increase in special benefits and` additional payments to permanent 
employees despite the general freeze in wages (Public Finance Statistics 1991:25). There 
was a considerable increase in the amount of funding to various ministries.4  
 By the end of 1991, the government was lagging behind on the front of social 
security reform, the reduction of public deficit and the fight against tax evasion. Despite 
Mitsotakis’ liberal rhetoric, the government made little progress towards market 
liberalisation and privatisation. Its actual record in the first two years included the sale of 
peripheral loss-making companies and the tackling of their debts. The much larger public 
sector companies remained under state ownership. Initial plans to privatise the majority 
of the shares in the big state-owned companies proposed in September 1991 by the 
economically liberal minister of commerce, Andreas Andrianopoulos, were rejected. 
There were profound disagreements among prominent New Democracy politicians over 
the economic ideology of the government. On the one side, traditional centre-right 
politician and first minister of economy, Souflias, aired the opinion ‘that the market 
should operate freely but there should be control over cases of excessive profits’ (Nea, 
25.08.1990, p.19) while, on the other side, Andreas Andrianopoulos, became openly 
critical of the government’s performance: 
‘Neoliberalism means two things: reduction of the public sector on the one hand 
and reduction of taxation on the other. Here, we have had neither the one nor the 
other’ (Nea, 25.08.1990, p.19). 
Right from the start, New Democracy’s fiscal policy met strong and coordinated 
reactions in the form of rounds of strikes and sizeable demonstrations from trade unions 
whose leadership was affiliated with PASOK. In the summer of 1990, they opposed the 
pay freeze in the public sector and the government’s privatisation plans which they 
repeatedly described as scandalous ‘sell-offs’.5 In September 1991 PASOK unionists 
raised maximalist claims for pay rises substantially above inflation and supported further 
strike action despite the reservations raised by New Democracy and left-wing unionists. 
A barrage of strikes followed: there were two 48-hour general strikes; cleaning workers 
left piles of garbage on the streets of Athens, industrial action in the electricity company 
caused periodic cuts of electricity supply, while strikes in public transport left Athens 
without a bus service for several weeks 
Privatisation, union mobilisation and PASOK 
The announcement of privatisation plans sent shockwaves to trade unions and employees 
in the public sector who responded with strikes and rallies.6 Prominent PASOK 
politicians openly endorsed the protests against privatisations.7 Reactions escalated with 
the closing down of Piraiki Patraiki, a deficit-running textiles company. Another 151 
companies were scheduled to be sold or liquidated. The waves of strikes in public utility 
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companies sent a clear message to the government not to proceed with its privatisation 
plans for the state monopolies in telecommunications, electricity, railways, airlines, post 
office and Greece’s major banks.  
 As the first few sales increased uncertainty over the future of the larger state-owned 
companies and the employment status of their workforce, public statements by 
government officials did little to appease the anxiety among their employees. Minister of 
economy, Souflias, admitted that he could not predict the size of unemployment caused 
by privatisation but he could estimate the gain for the state at ‘510 billion at least’ (Nea, 
May 1990, p.24). His successor, Christodoulou, described public companies as 
‘depositories for the unemployed’ that had to be restructured (Nea, 13.12.1990, p.16). A 
broader ideological vision to sponsor the policy was missing from government rhetoric. 
The government advocated its privatisation programme primarily as a way to cut 
subsidies and raise revenue rather than a policy to liberalise markets and prices in order 
to improve competitiveness and improve services.8 The government rebranded 
privatisations as ‘de-etatisations’ (apokratikopoiiseis), a neologism invented to avoid any 
allusion that privatisation was a general sell-out. Not surprisingly, privatisation became a 
divisive issue among the public opinion.9 The government plan was also viewed with 
suspicion by part of New Democracy’s rank-and-file with close ties with public sector 
unions. 
 The fiercest protest against a privatisation project took place in reaction to the 
dismantling of the Athens Bus Company in August 1992 leading to the dismissal of 8,000 
employees. The rallies lasted for days and were openly supported by PASOK politicians. 
When the government offered the company employees preferential treatment in the 
purchase of individual buses under the new scheme, the union leaders associated with 
PASOK and the Communist Party rejected the proposal and organised rallies that 
eventually led to clashes on the streets of Athens. Following the escalating reactions from 
PASOK, the trade unions, and segments of the government party, further privatisation 
was halted and the agenda was largely compromised. While the actual sales had only 
affected a few thousand employees (Nea, 19. May 1990, p.25), New Democracy was 
experiencing considerable social unrest and a loss in popularity while failing to deliver on 
the ambitious reforms it had initially announced. Mitsotakis’ uncompromising stance on 
privatisation and, in particular, in the case of the Athens Bus Company contributed to his 
increasingly unpopular image as an intransigent and overconfident leader. His shrinking 
circle of supporters was portrayed by the media as neoliberal zealots who preferred 
privatisation over any other effort to modernise public companies.10  
 The general backlash against government policy offered PASOK the opportunity to 
consolidate and reinvigorate its support basis in the broader public sector. PASOK 
vehemently opposed the government’s fiscal policies. The 1991 budget was dubbed ‘the 
harshest and most class-biased budget of the last decades’.11 The anti-austerity rhetoric 
allowed the party to distance itself from the bitter memories of its own strict programme 
a few years ago. PASOK spokesmen repeatedly rejected the privatisation of state-owned 
companies, and openly defended the status quo by propagating a strong role for the 
government in a wide area of economic activity: in ‘natural’ monopolies in sectors such 
as electricity and telecommunications, in monopolies and oligopolies in product and 
service markets that have ‘a predominantly social character’ such as public transport, in 
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sectors of ‘national-strategic importance’ such as shipyards, in large industrial companies 
that can be used as ‘tools for government industrial policy’ such as the Greek cement 
industry (AGET) and the large textile company Piraiki-Patraiki, and, finally, in the 
banking system where ‘banks under state control shall channel funds to particular 
investment projects’ (Arsenis 1992; Also Nea 6.4.1993, p.11). These areas covered 
almost all the employment settings where PASOK had a dominant political presence.  
  By the end of 1991, the government was under attack on two fronts. On the political 
front, it was facing a general revolt orchestrated by PASOK and its trade unions with no 
signs of compromise from their part. Their joint activities were creating an atmosphere of 
general social unrest.12 Mitsotakis’ intransigent stance on economic reforms was 
strengthening the symbiotic relationship between PASOK and the trade unions. In 
response, PASOK’s vocal criticism of the government policy and the active endorsement 
of union actions helped the party restrain the influence of the Left parties, KKE and 
Synaspismos, in the labour movement. PASOK reconfirmed its dominant position in the 
trade unions by winning a clear majority in the General Union, GSEE, in March 1992.  
 On the front of the economy, results were poor and the government came under 
pressure to accelerate its effort for macroeconomic stabilization. The first stabilisation 
plan had limited success mostly by curbing government spending, raising state revenue, 
reducing tax evasion and restraining appointments in the public sector. The 
Commission’s Report criticised the government for its economic policy between 1991 
and 1992, in particular its inconsistent tax reform and the slow progress of privatisation. 
The Monetary Committee of the European Communities was also critical of government 
policy, reporting an actual increase in new appointments to the public sector by 1.2% 
contrary to the government pledges (Nea, 17.4.1992, p.16). In May 1992 the President of 
the Commission, Jacques Delors, talked of Greece’s failure to follow the European 
course despite the support of the funds the country was receiving from the Community. 
Following two gloomy reports by OECD and IMF, former Prime Minister, Xenophon 
Zolotas, and leading economist, Angelos Angelopoulos, openly criticised the government 
for taking patchy and ineffective measures that had failed to reduce considerably the level 
of public spending. They both warned that the country was heading to bankruptcy.13 Even 
Andrianopoulos, Mitsotakis’ liberal ally, called the first stabilisation programme an 
‘imitation’ of the previous programme by PASOK between 1985 and 1987 only ‘with a 
slant to other directions such as privatisation’ (Economikos Tahydromos, 11.06.1992, 
p.5).  
In response, Mitsotakis appointed an economically liberal politician, Stefanos 
Manos, as minister of the economy in February 1992 to accelerate the government’s 
stabilisation effort. Manos admitted that there had been serious deviations from the 
declared economic targets and that the government had to start from a worse position. In 
March 1992, the government announced tax raises, further privatisations and the closing 
down of public companies. In response, the unions organised a new round of strikes in 
the broader public sector companies in telecommunications, electricity, post office, water 
and sewage, ports, railways, banks and the petrol industry. In December 1992, the 
government presented a new Convergence Programme (1993-1998) with tight monetary 
and fiscal targets and a strict incomes policy (Bank of Greece 1992:21). 
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 At the same time, increasing social unrest and poor economic results led to a sharp 
decline of New Democracy’s popularity. By November 1991, New Democracy was 
lagging behind PASOK in opinion polls (Nea, 19.11.1991, p.12). Few months later, in 
April 1992, PASOK won a landslide victory in a by-election in Athens, the country’s 
largest constituency, increasing its voting score by 30%, or 100,000 votes.14 A triumphant 
Papandreou described the government as ‘non-existent’ and the country as ‘ungoverned’. 
On an interview at a TV channel right after the electoral results, former Conservative 
Prime Minister Georgios Rallis proposed a broader coalition between ND and PASOK 
but the proposal was rejected by the two parties. Mitsotakis defended his economic policy 
before the parliament and pledged to keep to the convergence programme for another two 
years. He confronted mounting criticism from New Democracy’s cadres and eventually 
had to call a vote of confidence, which he won. Throughout August and September 1992 
strikes and rallies escalated in public transport, universities, the electricity monopoly, 
banks, gas stations, the post office, secondary education and farmers. Government 
officials were publicly booed by the crowd at the celebration in honour of the Greek 
Olympic medallists at the Panathinaicon Stadium on 11 August 1992.  
 
New Democracy’s withering cohesion 
While PASOK was reinforcing its political position, internal divisions and criticism 
against Mitsotakis’ policies were undermining the cohesion of New Democracy. The 
government was becoming increasingly alienated from traditional right-wing voters. The 
government’s tax reform, for instance, triggered the reaction of doctors and lawyers. 
Lawyers went on a prolonged strike that lasted for 9 months with few in-between 
intervals. Inside New Democracy most reactions to Mitsotakis’ economic policy came 
from the party faction known as the popular right (laiki dexia) with linkages to patronage 
politics and closely associated with the trade unions and the heavily subsidised 
agricultural cooperatives (Kazakos 1993:154). Prominent New Democracy politicians 
were supporting a greater role of the state and were opposed to the government’s 
privatisation plans.15 They were also highly apprehensive of New Democracy’s falling 
popularity among public sector employees, particularly in companies that were scheduled 
for privatisation.16  
 Privatisation turned out to the most divisive economic issue inside New Democracy. 
Strong reaction from segments of New Democracy associated with the state sector made 
it harder for the government to implement a bold policy agenda (C.f. Kazakos 2003).  
New Democracy’s labour organisations actively joined the general protest against the 
government’s privatisation plans. The tone of their reaction came to emulate PASOK’s 
harsh language (Nea 11.12.1992, p.18). The privatisation plans for Olympic airways and 
the state monopolies in electricity, telecommunication and railways triggered clashes 
within the Cabinet - the most prominent between the liberal Andreas Andrianopoulos and 
Miltiadis Evert, a politician with the aspiration to becoming the next New Democracy 
leader, (Nea, 24.05.1990, p.17; and, 24.09.1991, p.2). Later on, Andrianopoulos, who had 
been appointed as the minister for commerce, openly announced that he had been the 
target of ‘entrenched interests’ in the trade unions and the management of the ailing state-
owned enterprises.17 Likewise, a number of managers in the broader public sector 
appointed by the government were not enthusiastic with the prospect of losing their posts 
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once privatisation was completed.18 Several ministers were also unwilling to respond to 
Mitsotakis’s request to submit lists of public enterprises for privatisation or closure 
(Economikos Tahydromos, 27.02.1992, p.3). The various delays and hurdles to the 
privatisation process caused the head of OAE, the organisation in charge of the ailing 
enterprises lined up to be privatised, to resign in protest for the frequent interference of 
government ministers in the privatisation programme: 
‘After working for more than a year I am certain that the ministers supervising the 
privatisation policy are the genuine children of statism, which is what brought 
them to prominence in the past, and that they cannot distance themselves from 
their old philosophy’ (Economikos Tahydromos, 27.06.1991, p.16)  
Tensions in the government party escalated as privatisations and austerity were limiting 
the available opportunities for clientelist exchange (Vima, 20.09.1992, p.8). New 
Democracy sympathisers and its grassroots organisations were putting pressure on the 
government to accommodate the demands of their political clientele which mostly 
involved appointments in the public sector (Vima 26.09.1991, p.26). Given the adverse 
state of public finances, party politicians had a limited scope to deliver favours 
(‘rousfetia’) to supporters except for costless concessions such as promotions and 
favourable placements (Vima 30.06.1991, p.27 and Nea, 18.03.1993, p.19) or the military 
(Kyriakatiki, 3.10.1993). As a result, New Democracy supporters were frequently 
complaining that PASOK was still the most powerful political force in the broader public 
sector.  
 Grievances and frictions concerning government policy and the privatisation process 
at times culminated in fierce resignations and allegations of corruption. In November 
1992, minister of agriculture, Hatzigakis, resigned in disagreement with the government’s 
decision to hire a private company to patrol forests for ‘ideological, political, economic 
and moral grounds’. Few days later he stated that ‘he would have been an accomplice to a 
crime had he signed the decision’ (Vima 29.11.1992, p.1992). Similarly, former Minister 
of Health, Sourlas, talked of organised interests in pharmaceuticals that had pushed for 
his expulsion from the government (Nea, 04.12.1992, p.14). Allegations of corruption 
such as those ones regarding the management of ailing corporations and the privatisation 
process were widely reported in the press.19  
 Finally, business interests attached to the state sector and competing for preferential 
treatment became a major source of opposition to New Democracy’s policy. Like any 
government in Greece, New Democracy had to address public sector contractors and 
suppliers whose political influence by the early 1990 had been strengthened through the 
ownership of private media (C.f. Papathanassopoulos 1999). The stakes for public sector 
contractors were higher than ever as Community funds were channelled to Greece while 
the privatisation programme was about to change drastically the terms of competition in 
the state sector. For state-sponsored businessmen, privatisation threatened to break their 
long-established links with public sector companies and their managers (Lyberaki and 
Tsakalotos 2002:108). Government spokesman, Magginas, openly referred to attempts by 
media owners to prevent the government from implementing its policy in the state 
monopolies of electricity and telecommunications: 
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‘The government policy hurts the interests of some known businessmen who have 
contracts with these state monopolies as well as the interests of some equally 
well-known partisan unionists’ (Nea, 26.6.1993, p.11) 
By 1992 Mitsotakis’ policies had displeased some of the country’s most powerful press 
barons (C.f. Pagoulatos 1994). The majority of private media, which a few years ago had 
revealed the scandals in which PASOK politicians including Papandreou himself had 
been allegedly involved, now switched to support PASOK. The public image of 
Papandreou, once presented by most of the press as an ailing politician presiding over a 
corrupt government, was restored. At the same time, a barrage of press releases was 
slashing government ministers, the Prime Minister and his family. Mitsotakis famously 
used the word ‘diaplekomena’ (entangled interests) to describe the collusion between 
state-sponsored businessmen and political power, a term which became emblematic in 
Greek politics: 
‘If the media get controlled by the big and entangled interest groups 
[diaplekomena]... this would mean the end of democracy in Greece... We [his 
government] were responsible, and we paid the related political cost. We had the 
courage not to compromise, and I am proud of that’ (Praktika Voulis, Synod A, 
Session E, 24.10.1993) 
 
Culmination of protests and Mitsotakis’ fall from power  
By the end of 1992, protracted austerity, poor economic results, divisions over 
privatisation and within-party reactions to specific policies had pushed the cohesion of 
New Democracy to its limits. Resignations from the Cabinet soon became frequent news 
in the media. Soon the group of dissenters grew. Some of them had supported Mitsotakis 
in his 1984 election to the party leadership and had been on the front line of the 1989-
1990 electoral campaign. Deputy Prime Minister, Athanasios Canellopoulos publicly 
expressed his disapproval of the government’s economic policy and said that the 
government measures were ‘unjust and lacking imagination’ (Vima, 9 January 1992). 
Canellopoulos resigned from the government a few days later accusing the PM for his 
refusal to discuss economic policy with cabinet ministers. He was joined by former 
minister Miltiadis Evert on 11 February 1992. Later on, in a parliamentary speech Evert 
blamed the government for following a policy that was shrinking the economy and 
causing stagflation (Nea, 18.3.1992, p.14). As New Democracy’s parliamentary majority 
relied on two MP seats, it was impossible for Mitsotakis to punish the dissenters with 
expulsion from the party, for the reason that this move could bring his government down. 
Inside the party, the opposition was formed around two aspiring leaders of New 
Democracy, on the one side, Antonis Samaras, former minister of foreign affairs who 
Mitsotakis had ousted from the Cabinet for his disagreement over foreign policy on the 
Macedonian name dispute, and on the other side, former minister Evert surrounded by 
Kanellopoulos and former minister Dimas. The three men jointly submitted a 
memorandum to the prime minister asking for the postponement of the proposed 
economic measures that, in their view, had led to economic recession and were socially 
unjust. Antonis Samaras eventually resigned as an MP on 21 October 1992, attacking the 
policy of ‘hard drachma’ and the government’s obsession with reducing the deficit (the 
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‘deficit-mania’ as he called it) on several occasions (Nea, 4 and 10 December 1992). A 
new round of confrontations within the party erupted when the 1993 budget announced 
the partial privatisation of OTE, Greece’s telecommunication monopoly, within that year. 
The planned privatisation of OTE turned out to be the most divisive issue for the 
government party.20 New Democracy’s trade unionists and politicians openly voiced their 
objections. A number of ND MPs stated that they might vote against the budget.  
 The privatisation of OTE was seen by trade unions as a forerunner to a new round of 
privatisations, this time involving the large public utilities companies in electricity, 
railways, airlines, water, oil refineries, post office and the banks. To avoid further 
reactions Stefanos Manos pledged that the electricity company would remain under 
exclusive state ownership.21That reassurance hardly appeased the reactions. In the 
summer of 1993 trade unions whose leaderships were affiliated to PASOK organised a 
new round of strikes and rallies which created an explosive social atmosphere.22 GENOP-
DEI, the trade union in the electricity company, dubbed the privatisation process ‘the 
Prime Minister’s robbery plans’ that were ‘paving the way for a raid by foreign capital 
and the prime minister’s company at the expense of national wealth’ (Nea, 24.07.1993, 
p.7). Papandreou himself visited the headquarters of OTE and, cheered by unionists and 
employees, he openly pledged to cancel the privatisation upon his return to power (Nea, 
05.05.1993, p.5).  
 Reactions inside the party escalated in the summer of 1993. Both former ministers 
Samaras, who had founded a new party, Political Spring, and Evert, who stayed in New 
Democracy, openly expressed their objections to the OTE plan.23 Evert announced his 
decision to vote against the privatisation unless there were guarantees concerning the 
transparency of the process and the government was to retain control over key firm 
decisions (Nea 16.7.1993, p.8). In a letter to the government and the party, New 
Democracy’s unionists of OTE warned the government that they were on the point of a 
final break with the party (Nea, 15.7.1993, p.8). In September 1993 Antonis Samaras and 
his allies in the New Democracy withdrew their vote of confidence in the government in 
protest against the handling of the Macedonian name dispute. A month after the 
government had officially announced the partial privatisation of OTE, the sale was 
aborted and a fierce electoral period began. Mitsotakis openly talked of business circles 
orchestrating his fall from power and preparing for the return of PASOK to government. 
In similar vein, the right-wing press talked of entrepreneurs with vested interests in the 
state monopolies in electricity and telecommunications whose media were openly 
supporting PASOK’s campaign (C.f. Typos tis Kyriakis, 3.10.1993). 
 PASOK’s campaign in the 1993 election was attacking New Democracy’s policies 
as ineffective, authoritarian and socially unjust. It named New Democracy ‘the party of 
bankruptcy’ that had failed to boost the economy despite the harsh measures it had 
imposed on society.24 PASOK’s message conveyed a clear disapproval of privatisations 
that were repeatedly named ‘sell-offs of national property’ and reiterated its preference 
for a strong and protective welfare and interventionist state.25 PASOK’s campaign and 
previous record in the opposition cultivated expectations among its support groups in the 
public sector that it would cancel the privatisation programme when in government. 
PASOK’s economic policy proposals were vague, placing emphasis on raising the 
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productivity of the Greek economy instead of following austerity policies, and 
emphasising the need for social dialogue and ‘new forms of social solidarity’:26  
‘At last, this is the end; the neoliberal parenthesis is shut down for good. We are 
putting an end to the austerity policy, the high prices, the unemployment, the 
selling-off of national wealth, the inequalities and authoritarianism [of the 
government]. The right to hope is rising again’ (Greece is the vision, PASOK’s 
campaign leaflet).  
From a defensive position, New Democracy criticised PASOK’s stance as obsolete and 
perilous for the economy.27 New Democracy’s 1993 campaign presented voters with the 
dilemma between reforms and rising levels of taxation,28 and pointed out the contrast 
between ‘fiscal responsibility’ exhibited by New Democracy and PASOK’s past record 
of ‘profligate and statist politics’: 
‘What is that PASOK desires: Power; without any concern about Greece; a large 
public sector, because a large public sector means a large scope for favours. It 
[PASOK] intends to surrender the [public] organisations to its party members and 
its trade unionists. It wants to cancel the privatisation (apokratikopoiisi) because 
some people will lose control over procurements... There was [once] the easy 
way: Endless promises, vote-buying, concessions, favours, appointments; the road 
PASOK knows very well. We have not followed it. We have chosen to stay 
uncompromisingly consistent with our positions, our values, our ideas... We have 
not been afraid of political cost.’ (New Democracy’s leaflet ‘Greece is not turning 
back).29 
The dramatic events that led to the fall of the New Democracy government helped the 
party restore some of its cohesion in the month before the October election. In an effort to 
cheer New Democracy’s supporters, government officials promised to relax economic 
policy if re-elected.30 The party’s campaign was also tainted with accusations that a 
number of New Democracy supporters had been hired to posts in public sector 
enterprises during the electoral period. This late call-to-arms by New Democracy failed 
to block PASOK’s march to power. With a coherent and active party base and the support 
of most of the private media, PASOK won the election with approximately 46% of the 
vote. The night of the election, Mitsotakis resigned as leader of New Democracy and a 
few days later the vast majority of the party’s MPs elected Evert in his place.  
 
The Mitsotakis period assessed: actions, reactions and collective action 
Faced with the general rebellion led by trade unions, the opposition and within-party 
factions and despite New Democracy’s weak parliamentary majority by two seats, the 
Mitsotakis government implemented important reforms, most notably the privatisation or 
liquidation of around 100 enterprises, the abolition of most price controls and the partial 
liberalisation of labour, house rents, fuel and credit. Whether dictated by the urgency of 
the economic condition, ideological conviction or both, Mitsotakis’ attempt to implement 
a bold and extensive reform agenda to reduce the size of the state proved to be a 
politically suboptimal decision. Economic policy and, for the most part, the privatisation 
programme moved the government party away from the clientelist equilibrium, 
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unleashing the reaction of interest groups that had been settled in the old status quo. 
Structural reform and privatisation threatened the status of client groups in the broader 
public sector with strong organisation capacity and ties to the political parties. It also 
threatened the position of state-dependent businessmen that were pushing for preferential 
treatment in their deals with public sector companies. As Mitsotakis noted: 
‘Privatisation between 1990 an 1993 proceeded amidst a climate of corruption of 
employees (the case of Pirelli), sit-ins in factories and on national roads, attacks 
on foreign investors, letters by Mr. Papandreou (OTE) and Tsohatzopoulos 
threatening prospective buyers (shipyards); it is a miracle in that climate of hatred 
and negation buyers were found and contracts were signed, which, to say the 
least, spared the government budget tens of billions of damages in the last two 
years’ (Mitsotakis in Economikos Tahydromos, 31.08.1995, p.22). 
Collective action against the reforms as well as the prolonged economic austerity 
generated a period of social unrest with two politically significant effects: PASOK, by 
orchestrated a general sabotage of the government policies thanks to its permanent ties 
with the unions and with an opportunistic alliance with private media and capitalised 
upon growing public dissatisfaction and the weakness of the Mitsotakis government to 
sell the reforms to the public opinion. By placing the interests of groups attached to the 
public sector under its sponsorship PASOK rebuilt its remarkable capacity to mobilise 
and coordinate its grassroots organisations. On the opposite site, New Democracy 
became alienated from key supporters mainly in the public sector. While the party’s 
official ideology was propagating a smaller state, large segments of the New 
Democracy’s base stood up to oppose actual policy decisions limiting appointments in 
the public sector, dismissing employees, and privatising companies, which all reduced the 
turf for political patronage. In essence, Mitsotakis presided over a party and a political 
system imbued with a statist economic ideology and eroded by clientelism. (Economikos 
Tahydromos, 11.06.1992, p.4). The policy was largely discredited by its own party cadres 
and at the end some of them placed a veto (Economikos Tahydromos, 27.02.1992, p.3). 
Ever since his electoral defeat in 1993, Mitsotakis remained bitter about the resistance his 
policies met. 
‘In privatisation, in market liberalisation, in the reform of social security, in 
education and welfare policies we faced harsh backlash everywhere, while 
political interest groups rushed to take advantage of the political cost my 
government was obliged to carry on its shoulders (Praktika Voulis, Synod A, 
Session E, 24.10.1993). 
 
Concluding remarks: Reforms and political mobilization 
The political fate of the Mitsotakis reform agenda is additional evidence that reforms 
trigger the reaction of groups expecting direct and severe losses and that they fail to 
mobilise enough support for the reason that the anticipated fiscal and economic benefits 
at the stages of decision and implementation are too dispersed and uncertain. The pattern 
observed in the Mitsotakis’ period is also a refinement of this general hypothesis 
indicating that collective action in a highly clientelist political economy has distinct 
implications for party politics because of the position of the affected groups in the party 
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system. Clientelism describes the incorporation of rent-seeking into party structures and 
the political integration, or even merging, of rent-seeking groups with the party system. 
Client groups differ from typical rent-seeking groups in terms of autonomy from, 
bargaining power against, proximity to, and importance for the political parties. 
Consequently, clientelist parties must continue to deliver selective benefits to their 
clientele such as better terms of employment, generous benefits and pension schemes 
even in conditions of economic crisis in order to incentivise their active support which is 
essential for their political campaign. Political parties are, therefore, locked in a political 
equilibrium that tends to be collectively irrational from an economic point of view as a 
crisis approaches and later escalates. Measures to tackle this crisis, however, are 
politically suboptimal to the extent that they disturb existing clientelist commitments. In 
short, resistance to policy reform comes from within the structure of the clientelist party.  
 In real-world settings, governments often implement sweeping reforms for many 
reasons, such as ideology, economic shocks, pressures from international institutions and 
the urgency of the crisis. Strategic miscalculations or ideological predispositions may 
lead a government to implement a reform agenda with characteristics that run contrary to 
the dominant strategy favouring keeping clientelism intact. When such reforms are 
launched, they are likely to trigger the reaction of client groups attached either to the 
government party or to the opposition party. Collective action takes the form of defensive 
mobilisation against the reforms and could change the relative mobilisation capacity of 
the political parties. Policies that pose limits to the supply of clientelism offer the 
leadership of the opposition the opportunity to restore and strengthen the unity of the 
party by strategically standing up to defend the interests of its client groups. The 
opposition party can renew its clientelist ties and can eventually profit in the next election 
from the collective action of the client groups taking place under its auspices. The same 
policy mix can undermine the cohesion of the government party by alienating client 
groups in the sectors hurt by reform and can offer grounds for the internal opposition to 
appeal to discontented party supporters. At the end, the party leadership may suffer from 
frictions and tensions inside the party that potentially lead to factionalism and defections. 
As unity falls apart, the party’s chances of winning the next election are diminishing.  
 
Notes 
                                                 
1.    Among the most prominent works on clientelism in Greece: Mouzelis, 1978; Lyrintzis, 1984; 
Mavrogordatos, 1984; Spourdalakis 1988; Sotiropoulos, 1994 and 2001; Tsoukalis 1997; Pappas, 
1999; Lyberaki and Tsakalotos, 2002; Pagoulatos 2003; Lavdas, 2005. 
2.     Programmatic declarations of Prime Minister Mitsotakis on 24.4.1990 in the Greek Parliament, 
Praktika Voulis, Δ Session, pp.18-19. 
3.   See interview by Henning Christophersen, Vice President of the EC Commission in charge of 
supervising Greece’s stabilisation programme at Nea, 24 February 1992. p.12 
4.    Funds allocated to the ministry of merchant shipping increased by 1,000% between 1989 and 1990, to 
the ministry of foreign affairs by more than 700% between 1990 and 1991, to the ministry of labour 
by over 300% between 1990 and 1991, and to the ministry of public order by around 100% between 
1990 and 1991. There was a sizeable increase in the expenses of the ministries of Aegean Sea (from 
630.7 to 1,215 million drachmas) and Northern Greece (from from 366.0 million drachmas to 1,546.8 
million drachmas) between 1988 and 1989 (source: Public Finance Statistics, 1991).  
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5.   For instance: Nea, 30.12.1991; 13.03.1992; 07.04.1993, p.10; 06.04.1993, p.10; 07.07.1993, p.16’ 
16.07.1993, p.8; 17.07.1993; 14; 26.07.1993, p.10; 12.08.1993, p.12. Also Vima 01.03.1992, p.12; 
6.    As documented in Nea, 25.05.1990, p.14; 08.11.1990, p.11; 01.11.1990, p.12; 23.02.1991, p.16; , 
14.03.1991, p.12; 20.03.1991, p.11; 21.03.1991, p.10’ 18.10.1993, p.12.  
7.   Nea, 28.05.1990, p.22; 31.08.1990, p.16; 28.11.1990, p.10-11; 21.02.1991, p.36; 26.02.1991, p.9; 
15.03.1991, p.26; 07.07.1993, p.16. 
8.    C.f. Nea, 23.3.1990, p.2. Minister of the economy, Manos, suggested that an increase in the price of 
telecommunication charges would raise the revenue the government could achieve by privatising the 
company (Economikos Tahydromos, 3.12.1992, p.4). See also; Economikos, 15.10.1992, p.43, and 
26.12.1991, p.33.   
9.     42.2% of respondents to a survey by Nea (19.11.1991, p.12) were in favour of privatisation and 
46.9% were against. 50.3 % of respondents to the MRB Opinion poll (Kathimerini 17.7.1993) held 
the view that privatisations ‘serve the interest of particular big business interest and they do not 
constitute an effort to make their operation more effective in the general interest of the economy’. 
10.    Nea on the ‘sell-off ‘of OTE, 19.11.1992, p.13; and Economikos Tahydromos, 22 July 1993, p.15. 
11.    Former PASOK minister Arsenis discussing the budget, Nea 04.12.1990, p.12. 
12.  When Greece’s general union, GSEE, signed an agreement with the industrialist’s organisation (SEV) 
for wage increases around 12.5% and 10.6% for the following two consecutive years (5 March 1991), 
PASOK’s Executive Bureau openly reprimanded Labros Kanellopoulos, head of GSEE, for his 
signature.  
13.    Nea 25 July 1992, p.16. Also; Interview of Angelopoulos, Nea, 23.09.1993, p.10. 
14.    New Democracy did not take part in that election. 
15.  As noted by Economikos Tahydromos 22.7.1993, p.15; 1/05.1997, p.32. See also: Nea, 22.05.1990 
p.24; 05.04.1991, p.20. Miranda Xafa, economic advisor to Mitsotakis at the time, admitted in an 
interview few years later that although there had been favourable economic conditions for the 
implementation of such a radical programme in the beginning, there had been multiple political 
reactions, some of the strongest coming from within the New Democracy: Economikos Tahydromos, 1 
May 1997, p.32. 
16.  For instance, there was a dramatic fall of 16.56% in the votes cast for New Democracy’s candidates in 
the trade union in the National Bank of Greece/Mortgage and the Industrial Development Bank 
(ETBA) against a 11.6% rise for PASOK’s candidates (Nea, 26.05.1993, p.17).  
17.   Andrianopoulos sent a letter to the Prime Minister (Vima, 28.06.1992, p.10). 
18.   Economikos Tahydromos 06.09.1990, p.78-79; 27.02.1992, p.4; and 11.12.1992, p.18.  
19.   C.f. Economikos Tahydromos, referring to auditing control and prosecutions, 15.08.1991, p.79. 
20.   Nea, 08.07.1993, p.6; 08.04.1993, p.6; 12.07.1993, p.8; and 24.07.1993, p.7.  
21.   Economikos Tahydromos, 05.08.1993, p.4. 
22.   Nea, 26.05.1993, p.17; and 12.08.1993, p.9. 
23.   Nea 28.7.1993, p.11;  
24.  C.f. PASOK’s leaflet ‘Enough is enough: there is another solution’, which criticised New Democracy’s 
policies for producing unemployment, closures, a dramatic reduction of incomes, an increase of social 
inequalities, the ‘commercialisation’ of the health system and the ‘selling-out’ of national property, 
with direct references to public enterprises in telecommunications, electricity, manufacturing, 
shipyards and public transport. 
25.   See, for instance, PASOK’s leaflet for young voters, ‘Today we turn the page: 1990-1993’: ‘We were 
appalled by the selling-off or our national property... We are asking for subsidies for new job posts, 
educational seminars for the young, incentives and support for new professionals and scientists, 
subsidies to new couples for accommodation, support and protection of the newly employed, a stable 
meritocratic system of appointments to the public sector, priority in employment for people with 
special needs... We demand the permanent closure of the private para-universities’.  
26.   ‘Greece is the Vision’, PASOK’s campaign leaflet. 
27.  ‘We are in the position to ascertain that the austerity is going to end’ said Mitsotakis in an interview in 
Eleftherotypia, 3.10.1993. Minister of internal affairs, Kouvelas, stated in another interview:  
        ‘Whenever they [PASOK] exerted criticism, they asked us to follow their practices from the 80s. It 
[PASOK] is against privatisations, they have always wanted the giant-state. They try to portray the 
protagonists of scandals as heroes. We have not seen a new programme. What its members are 
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proposing is incoherent and contradictory... Their ideology remains the same: Third World socialism’ 
(Eleftheros Typos, 5.10.1993). 
28    Interview by minister of internal affairs, Sotiris Kouvelas to Andreas Zoulas, Apogevmatini, 
1.10.1993. 
29.  A quote from the New Democracy’s electoral leaflet, ‘5+5 facts you cannot dispute’: “We have to 
decide for the future of the country, the future of our children. Between a strong Greece and an over-
indebted Greece which is obliged to ‘beg’ for borrowed money. We have laid the foundations. At a 
time of uncertainty and tension, our country is safe, secure and peaceful. Now that it takes strength 
and responsibility, should we trust Greece to Mr. Papandreou? Shall we risk it?’,  
30.  C.f. ‘Generous increases for the public employees’, interview by minister of internal affairs Kouvelas 
to Andreas Zoulas, Apogevmatini, 1.10.1993; also Makedonia, 6.9.1993. 
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